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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN, . . 
vs. 
KENT 
Plaintiff- . . 
Respondant. Case No.· 18,132 
. 
• 
• . 
CHRISTIANSEN, 
. 
• 
Defendant-
Appellant . . 
APPELLANT, KENT CHRISTIANSEN'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is a post divorce modification proceeding in which 
plaintiff-respondent, Jana c·. Christiansen, (hereinafter, 
"plaintiff") brought this modification proceeding to increase 
defendant-appellant Kent Christiansen's (hereinafter 
"defendant") child support obligations to plaintiff under a 
Decree of Divorce, dated July 17, 1979. Plaintiff also sought 
an award of attorneys fees (R.27-29). Other issues raised by 
plaintiff's initial order to show cause were disposed of 
prior to the trial date herein. Defendant filed a Counter-
petition seeking primarily to: 1) reduce the amount of alimony payments 
to $100. 0.0 per month; ·2) set a fixed date for termination of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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alimony payments; and 3) eliminate the requirement from the 
Decree of Divorce that the defendant be required to maintain 
the plaintiff on his health and medical insurance policy (R.36-38) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter came on for trial on September 3, 1981, 
before the Honorable George E. Ballif, District Judge pre-
siding. Following the conclusion of the trial and introduction 
of evidence and testimony from both parties, the Court took 
the matter under advisement and rendered its Decision 
on October 8, 1981. A copy of the Court's Decision is attached 
hereto as Appendix "A" and incorporated by reference. 
The trial court increased the amount of the defendant's 
child support payments from $275.00 per month (R.22-23) 
to $450.00 per month- per child for each of the parties two 
minor children (R.46). 
The trial court also ruled that the defendant had failed 
to show a sufficient change in circumstances to justify the 
reduction or elimination of the alimony previously ordered 
in the Decree of Divorce. The Court also concluded that the 
defendant should pay $200.00 as attorneys fees for the use and 
benefit of the plaintiff's counsel. (R.46) The Court did not 
rule on the other issues raised by the defendant's order to 
show cause specifically that the defendant be released from the 
requirement to maintain the plaintiff on his health and 
medical insurance policies. 
-2-
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The trial court overruled and denied the defendant's 
objections to the Findings of Fact and Modified Decree 
and defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed on November 25, 
1981 (R.56,57). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks the following relief on appeal: ( 1) A 
reversal of the trial court's decision that the defendant 
failed to show a sufficient material change in circumstances 
to justify a reduction or elimination of the amount of alimony payments 
paid by the defendant to the ~laintiff; or, alternatively a 
remand ·to the trial court to set an appropriate reduction 
in alimony payments. (2) A reversal of the trial court's decision 
increasing the amount of child support payments from $275.00 
per month per child to $450.00 per month per child for each of 
the parties two minor children. (3) An order from this Court 
terminating the defendant's responsibility to maintain· and pay 
for health and medical insurance coverage for plaintiff. 
(4) A reversal or alternatively a reduction of the court's 
award of attorneys fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Provo, Utah, on 
June 1, 1972. There were two children born as issue of the 
.. -3-
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said marriage to-wit: Alicia, who at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce was 3 years old; and Chad, who at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce was age 16 months (R.18). In July of 1979, 
the parties entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement 
agreement (R.14-16) which formed the basis of a Decree of 
Divorce which was subsequently entered by the Court following 
a hearing on July 17, 1979. The stipulation and property settlement 
agreement is attached hereto, labeled Appendix "B" and incorporated 
by its reference herein. The lower c6urt·•s Finding of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved the previously 
executed Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (Appendix 
uB") which granted the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $650.00 
per month, and child support in the amount of $275.00 per month 
for each of the parties two minor children (R.22,23). 
At the time of the original divorce hearing and the entry· 
of the Decree of Divorce, the lower court specifically found 
that "Plaintiff has no income" see Finding of Fact number 9, 
(R.20), and Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, 
paragraph 9, (R.16). The minute entry entered by the court at the 
time of the hearing on the Decree of Divorce reflects the · 
presence of the plaintiff and her counsel, Noall T. Wootton, 
and further reflects that the defendant was not present, but 
was represented by his counsel, Wayne B. Watson. The trial 
court further reflects.in its minute entry of July 17, ~979, 
that "counsel stated for the record that plaintiff has "0" 
-4-
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income at this time" (R.25). A copy of the court's minute 
entry dated July 17, 1979 is attached hereto as Appendix "C" 
and incorporated by reference. 
The defendant is a self-employed dentist, with a specialty 
in endotonics (R.78,124). At the time of the Decree of 
Divorce, the Court made specific findings that the defendant's 
net income was approximately $30,000.00 for the calendar 
year 1978 (R.19). It should be noted that the Decree of 
Divorce was granted on July 17, 1979 at a time when defendant's 
income had.probably increased slightly. Defendant opened a 
private practice in dentistry in Provo, Utah on approximately 
May 1, 1978, a little more than one year prior to the entry 
of the· Decree of Divorce (R.125). 
At the time of the modification hearing, defendant 
testified that he was drawing a base monthly salary o~ approximately 
$3,000.00 per month from his business which is now a pro-
fessional corporation (R.134). Defendant's 1980 individual 
income tax return demonstrated that he had an adjusted gross 
income of $30,538.00 for the year 1980 {see exhibit #5). In 
response to an order of the court, the defendant produced his 
complete individual income tax returns for the years 1979 
and 1980 and his corporate income tax return for the year 
beginning June 1, 1980, and ending March 30, 1981. While 
not all of those documents were marked as exhibits, they 
were produced following the trial pursuant to the request of 
-5-
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counsel for the plaintiff and are included in the court's 
record in the exhibit file. 
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
plaintiff had no income (R.16,20,25 and 145). Plaintiff testified 
that she had obtained a Masters Degree in Educational Psychology ~ 
and at the time of the modification hearing was making $779.50 w, 
per month gross and approximately $550.00 net by working three ill 
days per week as an Educational Psychologist in the Provo School ~ 
District (R.80,89 See also, plaintiff's Exhibit #4). 
The court further heard testimony from both the plaintiff 
and the defendant to the effect that full time employment may 
be available to the plaintiff through the Provo School District 
provided that her arthritic condition would permit her to accept 
such full time employment (R.80,141). Both plaintiff and 
defendant testified that the plaintiff's arthritic condition had 
stabalized since the time of the Decree of Divorce and that the 
plaintiff was able to function fairly well by taken medication 
that was prescribed for the arthritic condition (R.82,142): Plaintif: 
was presently very active and had recently taken up skiing (R. 
142,143). 
Both parties introduced evidence and were cross-examined 
concerning their monthly current expenses. Plaintiff listed month~ 
current expenses of $2,197.00 which she claimed had increased 
approximately $1,400.00 since the date of the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce (See plaintiff's exhibit #3, R.110, 112). Defendant 
claimed monthly current expenses of $3,166.24 including the 
alimony and support payments imposed hu 
(See defendant's exhibit #6). 
+-ho no,..,....oo 
' ... ,_, <~· ·-- ..__ '-~->' ' - "' ~ - ~-- ,,_,_, 
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Both parties i:c~stified that the pa:t .. ties contemplated the 
$16, 000., 00 i.n c.1!>h property Sf?ti:le.'1c~nt referred to in 
paragraph 1~7 oi: the Occree of Oi.vorcc~ (lL23) wouj d be used in 
purchasing the condo11inium that plaint i. i~ r: presently resides 
in, and furthee, l:hai: the condo.1inium llf.JS purchased contemporaneously 
with the entry of the Decree of Divo.i::ce (R .• 100,14-.~.>)'> ·'rhe 
plaintiff's own test:imony in th:1t rc~qat·d is particularly reveal j ng ~ 
Q: (By Mr) Snyder) Now, at the~ t.i.me of the Decree of 
Divorce, you also had made plan~-) to purchas(~ the 
condominium that you are presently living inv hadn't 
you? 
A: (By Mrs~ Cht""istiansen) 'Th(~ deal wasn't finalized. 
I had hoped that I could. 
,· .- . 
Q.: But you we:t:.e 90.in.g~.t.n.ga..l.{ St6!f.ono.~GU .. 
in cash settlement that you received from your husband, 
and had already made an offer to purchase the condo-
minium in American Fork, subject to your getting that 
money and closing the rest of the f i.nancial arrangements, 
hadn't you·? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you did, in fact,. :·!ake that $16,000(< 00 settlement 
and purchased the condominium that you are presently 
living in, isnt that true? 
A: Yes, that is true. 
-Q: So these additional living expenses that you are point-
ing to, these addi t_ional house payments, totaling 
$3l5e00 in increases, were something that you contemplated 
at the time of the Decree of Dlvorce? 
A: Yes. (R~J.00, 101) 
Plaintiff further testifieo wi i:t:. re9ard to her expenses 
that at the time of the Decree of D.i.-vorce, she was driving 
-7-
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a 1975 Mustang II automobile which was paid for and that since 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce, she had gone out and 
purchased a 1980 Camaro (R.102). Plaintiff further 
testified in accordance with her exhibit #3 that she had 
$100.00 per month in medical expenses but later conceded 
that her husband pays for all of her bills for medication 
and her doctors expenses, (Re92). Furthermore, since· the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, she had purchased drapes and 
a refrigerator for the house, and had taken out a loan with a 
monthly payment of $131.50 on that amount. (R.114). 
In connection with the loan payment in the amount of $131.50 
for the drapes and refrigerator, plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Snyder) Let me ask you just briefly 
about the loan payment. That was something you contem-
plated in connection with the purchase of your condo-
minium, isn't that true? 
A: (By Mrs. Christiansen) No. 
(By Mr. Snyder) You knew-~excuse me. Go ahead. 
A: I guess I really didnt have any idea how much things 
cost at the time of the divorce. I realized we had 
nothing. But I had no idea as to the cost of the drapes 
and a fridge and just the bear necessities. 
Q: But in truth and in fact, you knew that you were going 
to have to buy a refrigerator for that condominium, and 
you were going to have to put some drapes in it, and 
that type of thing, and you knew that in connection with the 
purchase of the condominium, and you contemplated doing 
that at the time of the Decree, isn't that true? You may not 
have known the price, but you knew you were going to have 
to get a refrigerator and drapes? 
A: I knew I was going to have to get a refrigerator. Kent 
gave me $16,000.00, and I paid down $15,000.00, so I figured 
-8-
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the extra $1000.00 I could use on a fridge and a few things. 
But I just didn't - I guess I figured that, but I didn't 
realize that the drapes and all those things would come 
to so much. Am I saying too much? (R.113,114} 
It is interesting to note that the court in its decision 
cited the increased expense of $250.00 per month for child 
care, necessitated by the plaintiff obtaining employment, but 
failed to consider or recognize the fact that plaintiff had 
increased income which would more than off-set that expense. 
{R.45,89. See also, exhibit #4). Plaintiff also int.ro-
duced evidence concerning increased expenses necessitated 
by the purchase of the washer and dryer which were purchased 
by the plaintiff following the initiation of the order to show 
cause proceeding and which washer and dryer had not even 
been delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the trial of 
this matter (R.104). 
Plaintiff claimed additional increases in expenses due to 
inflation, but the only dollar amounts presented as evidence 
with respect to increases in the expenses of the children 
were an additional $10.00 per month charge, for pre-school 
costs for the parties son {R.93). 
Plaintiff also claimed increased expenses attributed to 
the children's recreation, and the daughter's clothing, but 
failed to present any evidence concerning amounts (R.92,94). 
-9-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT A DECREASE IN THE 
AMOUNT OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS BASED UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S 
INCREASED INCOME. 
It is axiomatic that the district courts of this state 
are vested with considerable discretion with regard to alimony, 
child support and attorney's fees. On appeal, the decisions 
of the the district courts are accorded great deference: 
In a divorce case, even though the proceedings are 
equitable and this court may review the evidence, this 
court accords considerable deference to the findings 
and judgment of the trial court due to its advan-
tageous position. On appeal this court will not disturb 
the action of the trial court unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial 
court has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles 
of law ••• Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 at 1222 
(Utah 1980). 
Mindful of the burden he bears on appeal, defendant 
requests this court to reverse the lower court's decision that 
a sufficient change in circumstances was not shown to 
justify the reduction or elimination of alimony paid by 
defendant to the plaintiff (R.46), upon the grounds that the 
lower court misunderstood and/or misapplied the law, resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error, and/or perpetrated such 
a serious inequity as to constitute an abuse of the court's 
discretion. This concept was explained by the court in 
Mccrary v. Mccrary, 599 P.2d 1248, at 1250 (Utah 1979): 
-10-
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In these matters, a party seeking a reversal 
of the trial court must prove a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings or that such 
a serious inequity resulted from the order as to 
constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion • • • • 
The purpose of alimony is to "provide support for the wife 
as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage, and to prevent the wife from becomming 
a public charge". English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah, 
1977}. This calls for determining "the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to procure sufficient 
income for herself, and the ability of the husband to 
tG provide support". Id. at 412. 
The courts have held that the factors to be considered in 
determining whether to modify an alimony award are the same as 
the factors taken into consideration when granting an 
award for support and alimony. See Scott v. Scott, 591 P.2d 
980 (Arizona, 1979). 
In Gramme v. Gramme, 597 P.2d 134 (Utah, 1978), this court 
stated the purpose of ·an award of alimony and the criteria 
upon which an award of alimony may be based: 
The purpose of alimony is to provide 
post-marital support; it is intended neither 
as a penalty imposed upon the husband nor as a 
reward granted to the wife. Its function is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage and to prevent her from becomming a public 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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charge. Important criteria in dete:mining a 
reasonable ~ward for support and maintenance 
are the financial conditions and needs of the wife, 
considering her station in life; her ability to 
produce sufficient inco"me for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide the support. 
(Emphasis is added) ·Id.at 147 (footnotes omitted)* 
By applying the criteria as described in Gramme the plaintiff 
herein is no longer entitled to an award of alimony. Her present 
earnings are sufficient to support her at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during her marriage to the defendant. 
There is no indication that her financial situation could 
deteriorate to the point of making her a public charge. 
The lower court should have considered her young age, her 
ability to work and her present income with regard to the issue 
of reduction of alimony. 
In that regard, at the time of the Decree of Divorce, 
the plaintiff, Jana Christiansen was unemploy~d. The court 
entered a specific findings to that r~gard (R.16,20,25 and 
142). Since that time she has used her Masters Degree in 
Educational Psychology (R.80) to become gainfully employed 
at the Provo School District as an educational psychologist 
working three days a week. Both plaintiff and defendant 
testified that the plaintiff could obtain full time employment 
through the Provo School District (R.80, 141). Both plaintiff 
and defendant also testified that the plaintiff's arthritic 
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condition had stabilized with medication since the time of 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The uncontroverted 
evidence introduced at the time of the trial in this matter 
indicated that the plaintiff was earning approximately 
$800.00 per month gross, and $550.00 per month net (R.89,141, 
see also, plaintiff's exhibit #4). 
Quite clearly, the plaintiff is now earning a substantial 
salary which she was not earning at the time of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and is capable of earning even more if 
she chooses to accept full time employment. 
The trial court chose to ignore the Findings of Fact, Stip-
ulation and Property Settlement Agreement, and the court's 
own minute entry from the divorce hearing settipg for the fact that 
the plaintiff had no income at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce. The rationale behind the court's ruling is found 
in a discussion between the Court and counsel for the defendant 
which occurred during argument and following the conclusion of the 
evidence. That discussion is set forth in the transcript 
as follows: 
{Argument by Mr. Snyder): I think the evidence 
demonstrates a material change in circumstances with regard 
to her income that justifies decreasing the amount of 
the alimony. I think that that's a material change. 
The Findings of the Court clearly reflect--
THE COURT: If she can't go up, why should we 
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refuse it? 
MR. SNYDER: If she can't go up where? 
THE COURT: If she can't get an increase in 
alimony because he's earning additional money, why can't 
she be subject, then, to a reduction? 
MR. SNYDER: That was all done, as far as the 
stipulation---
THE COURT: --I know. Why should she, then 
also be restricted and reduced? 
MR. SNYDER: Because the Court made a specific 
finding concerning the fact that she had no income, 
and she now does have an income. 
THE COURT: I know, but it was set at a certain 
amount of money. 
MR. SNYDER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And she could not use his increased 
income to go up. 
MR. SNYDER: Right. 
THE COURT: Nothing was said that if she increased 
her income, she could go down. 
MR. SNYDER: No, but that, in·rny opinion, 
is a material change of circumstances which justifies the 
Court in reducing the amount of that alimony. She had no 
income at the time of the divorce. She hacl no income at that 
time, and she has income now. That's a change in circumstances 
which is material to the issues of alimony and the amount 
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that it was set· at, and justifies it being decreased. 
Furthermore, I think there is merit in the 
position that this Court ought not to let that alimony 
go on interminably forever. She is now employed; she is 
now able to earn her own way; she is not contributing to the 
income and the needs of the children, which she has not done 
before. 
I think those issues mandate a change in the amount--
reducing the amount--
THE COURT: --You want the benefit of that, then, 
when it comes to the support of the children,.the fact that 
she is working, in addition to the fact that that should 
reduce her income, and also reduGe--
MR. SNYDER: --I think' that the Court should 
definitely--
THE COURT: --Mr. Snyder, when the Court is talking 
don't cut in on me, will you, please. 
MR. SNYDER: 
THE COURT: 
MR. SNYDER: 
THE" COURT: 
MR. SNYDER: 
Excuse me. 
Did you hear what I said? 
Yes I did. 
All right. You may respond to it. 
I think that if the Court is not going 
to consider it in the question of alimony, which I think the 
Court should, then I think the Court should definitely 
consider it with regard to the matter of the child support, 
and her claims for needs for an increase. (R.161 line 21 through 
-1~-
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Rl63 line 20). 
The trial court's concerns reflect his interpretation of 
a portion of paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement, (R.16)(Appendix "B") which is incorporated into the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 9 (R.20). The 
Property Settlement Agreement (Appendix "B") reads, in pertinent 
part 
9. The parties further stipulate that· they.hereby 
request the Court to make a finding of fact that the 
plaintiff presently has no income, and that future 
increases in alimony shallbe based solely upon plaintiff's 
economic needs without any regard whatsoever to a 
possible increase in d~fendant's incom~ status." 
(Emphasis added) {R.16}. 
It was the trial judge's opinion that if the. plaintiff 
cannot use the defendant's increased income to seek future 
increases in her alimony payments, then the defendant should 
not be able to use plaintiff's increased income to justify 
reductions in the alimony payments. 
The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 9 of the 
Findings of Fact and the Property Settlement Agreement, 
clearly ignores the language contained in the first part of 
paragraph 9 to the effect that the plaintiff has no income 
and indeed, the language set forth by both parties' counsel 
on the record in the Minute Entry (Appendix "C") to the 
effect that the plaintiff has "0" income at this time. (R.25). 
Utah courts have long held that increases in income 
constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to 
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justify the increase or decrease in the amount of alimony 
payments. In the case of Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah, 
1976) the husband sought to reduce or eliminate alimony 
payments. In Dehm, at the time the Divorce Decree was entered, the 
wife had income of approximately $220.00 per month, and the 
husband earned $1,300.00 per month. By the time of the modification 
proceedings those numbers had increased to $946.00 and $2,200.00 
respectively. Also, during the period of time between the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce and the modification hearing the wife 
had received her Bachelors and Masters Degree and had become 
employed on a full time basis. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's decision reducing the alimony from $300.00 per 
month to $1.00 per year and found that under the circumstances, 
alimony was neither necessary nor reasonable. 
The written Decision (See Appendix "A") entered by the trial 
·court in this matter sheds further light on the trial court's 
unilateral attempt to modify the provisions of the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement and the Findings of Fact entered 
by the trial court. It is clear from the language of the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement that the plaintiff in this 
case agreed as part of that Stipulation and Property Settlement 
that she would not seek increased alimony based upon increases 
in the defendant's income. The trial court apparently felt 
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that 'What is good for the goose must be good for the gander". No 
such element of resciprosity can be inferred from the Stipulation 
or from the Findings of Fact, yet the trial judge in the modification 
hearing found that the plaintiff's agreement to not seek increased 
,, 
,. 
alimony based upon increases in the defendant's income should be applie;t: 
in reverse to the defendant. In other words, he should not 
be able to claim decreases in alimony based upon increases 
in the plaintiff's income. The trial court's Decision 
(Appendix. "A") reveals some additional information concerning 
the court's analysis with regard to paragraph 9 of the Findings of 
Fact and the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. Judge 
Ballif in his Decision states: 
"Ba.sea upon the above and fore.going findings, 
and upon the finding in the Decree of Divorce that 
only the plaintiff's economic needs, without regard 
to defendant's income, is the sole basis for 
increase in alimony and the further finding by the 
Court that the plaintiff's personal needs have not 
materially increased in that she has now obtained 
employment and is providing partially for her own 
support, the court concludes as follows: • • • • • 
2. The Court further concludes that a sufficient 
change of circumstance has not been shown to justify the 
reduction or elimination of the alimony paid by 
defendant to plaintiff and the amount provided in 
the original decree shall continue." (R.46). 
It is axiomatic the provisions of a Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement which are approved and incorporated 
into a Decree of Divorce cannot be subsequently modified 
or changed absent a showing of substantial injustice, fraud 
-18-
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or some other compelling reason. See Lay v. Lay, 162 Colo. 143, 
425 P.2d 704 and Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981). 
In the instant case the trial court has attempted to 
impose its own judgment effectively modifying the parties' 
Stipulation and effectively undertaking to unilateraly modify 
the parties' Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
by making a provision that is clearly applicable only to 
increases in alimony apply in reverse to decreases in alimony. 
The trial court has ignored the other findings of the 
court concerning plaintiff's income at the time of the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and the uncontroverted evidence concerning 
the plaintiff's increases in income at the time of the 
modification hearing. 
Defendant submits that alimony is not a matter of right. When 
the wife has the ability to earn a living, it is not the 
policy of the law to give her a perpetual lien on her divorced 
husband's future income. See Morgan v. Morgan, 369 P.2d 516 
(Washington, 1962). 
Utah courts have long recognized the principal that in-
creased earning capacity of the wife, following the entry of 
the Decree of Divorce, constitute a material change in 
circumstances which is sufficient to justify the court in 
reducing alimony payments. See King v. King, 495 P.2d 823, (Utah, 
1972). (A case similar to the instant case in that the former wife 
had a health condition at the time of the divorce which prevented 
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her from seekirt;J and acceptirg gainful employment. That situation was at least 
partially resolved, and alimony payments were reduced fran $250. 00 P=r month 
to $100.00 per nonth for a period of six months and thereafter to. the sum of 
$50. oo per month for a :period of one year, after which, alimony was to terminate 
entirely). See also, Carter v. Ca.rter, 584 P.2d 904, (Utah 1978), (Carter 
is a case that is significant in that it was tried in the sa.ne district court 
and by the same trial judge as the instant case. In carter, the court reduced 
the defendant wife's alimony fran $350.00 per rronth to $100.00 ~r-rnonth on 
the basis that the defendant, who was not employed at the time of the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce, had beoorne employed and had a monthly salary of $636.27. , 
The Utah State Supreme Court in Carter held that one of the important factors-
to be considered is that it should be the PJlicy of the law to encourage a person 
receivir.g alimony to seek employment. Id, at 905.) 
other case citations havirtJ similar holdirgs have been omitted for the 
sake of brevity. 
~fendant submits that he is entitled to have the Court consider plaintiff 1s 
increased incane as bearirg on the question of reduc·ir.g the defendant's alifno!lY 
payments herein and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing its 
CJNn. interpretation· of paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and Property Settlerrent 
~reerrent and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to effectively hold 
that if the plaintiff had could not claim future increases in alimony based 
up:>n increases in the defendant's incane status, that the defendant could not 
base a decrease in alimony payments up::>n the plaintiff 1 s incane status. Such 
a holding by the trial court clearly controverts the expressed provisions of 
the parties' Stipulation, (Appendix "B"), and the findirgs made by the trial 
court at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. · 
-20-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
INCREASING CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM 
$275.00 PER MONTH PER CHILD TO $450.00 
PER MONTH PER CHILD FOR EACH OF THE 
PARTIES' TWO MINOR CHILDREN. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S 
INCREASED STANDARD OF LIVING AND INFLATED EXPENSES IN ORDER 
TO JUSTIFY INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
As indicated previously, it is well settled in this 
State that the modification of a divorce decree is. a matter 
of equity and that it is the duty and prerogative of the 
Supreme Court to review both the facts and the law in each 
case. Furthermore, the burden rests with the party seeking 
the modification of a divorce decree to show a substantial 
change in circumstances such as to warrant a modification. 
See Christensen v. Christensen, 6~8 P.2d.1297 (Utah 1981). 
In the same way that the defendant has the burden of demon-
strating a material change in circumstances such as to 
justify a decrease in the amount of alimony payments, the 
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a material change 
in circumstances such as would justify an increase in the 
child support payments. 
In the trial court's Decision (Appendix A), the court 
found that the expenses of the plaintiff in rearing the 
minor children had increased by virtue of inflation since 
the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 17, 
1979, and correctly pointed out that the expenses of the 
minor children were not established by any Findings of Fact 
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or stipulations on file herein at the time the decree was 
entered. The court further found that there were other 
increases in expenses in that the plaintiff has acquired 
new living facilities for herself and the children and had 
obtained employment which created an increased expense of 
$250.00 per month for child care. (R. 45) The court further 
observed that other expenses such as dancing and other 
lessons for the children were given only minimal weight by 
the court in arriving at an increase in child support that 
is justifiable under the changed circumstances of the 
children's needs. (R. 45-47) 
Addressing first the issue of the plaintiff's increased 
expenses, it is significant to note that the plaintiff 
claims total monthly living expenses of $2,197.29 and that 
her monthly living expenses have increased by $1,397.29 in 
the two· years between the entry of the Decree of Divorce and 
the modification hearing. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.) 
When questioned on cross-examination concerning the figures 
recited on Exhibit 3, plaintiff responded as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Snyder) And you have listed that 
you have total monthly expenses of roughly 
$2200.00, $2197.29, ri~ht? · 
A (By Mrs. Christiansen) Yes. 
Q And you say that those expenses have 
increased since the divorce by roughly 
$1400.00, $1397.29? 
A Yes. 
Q So at the time of the Decree of Divorce 
you mu~t have had monthly expenses of 
approximately $800.00, is that correct? 
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A Approximately. 
Q And yet at that time, at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce, you and your husband 
had alimony and support payments~-your 
husband began paying you support payments 
and alimony totaling $1200.00, is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q He has been paying you that amount since the 
time of the Decree, hasn't he? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you spend all of that money each month 
when it would come in? 
A No, because I started with a house payment 
the next month after we were divorced, and 
that house payment was $590.00. So I didn't 
have any spending money. 
(R. 111-112) 
The significance of the above testimony from the plain-
tiff is two-fold. One, it. indicates that at the time of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce, that the plaintiff had 
expenses only of $800.00 and yet she and the defendant 
agreed in a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
that the defendant would pay a total of $1,200.00 ($550.00 
child support and $650.00 alimony) towards the support and 
maintenance of the plaintiff and the minor children. The 
plaintiff further indicates. by her testimony that the payment 
of $1,200.00 in total support and maintenance considered the 
fact that she was going to be moving into the condominium 
which has a house payment of $590.00 per month together with 
increased utility expenses that were testified to by the 
plaintiff. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and R. 118). The 
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plaintiff further testified as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Snyder) Now, at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce, you also had made plans to purchase 
the condominium that you are presently living 
in, hadn't you? 
A (By Mrs. Christiansen) The deal wasn't finalized. 
I had hoped that I could. 
Q But you were going to pay $16,000.00 in cash 
settlement that you received from you husband, 
and had already made an of fer to purchase the 
condominium in American Fork, subject to your 
getting that money and closing the rest of the 
financial arrangements,· hadn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you did, in fact, make that $16,000.00 
settlement and purchased the condominium that 
you are presently living in~ isn't that true? 
A Yes, that's true. 
Q So these additional. living expenses that you are 
pointing to, these additional house payments 
totaling $315.00 in increases, were something 
that you contemplated at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce? 
A Yes. 
(R. 100-101) 
Similarly, the defendant testified: 
Q (By Mr. Snyder) Now, at the time of the signing 
of the Stipulation, just prior to the divorce 
in this matter, you were living in a rented 
housei is that correct? 
A (By Mr. Christiansen) Right. She moved into 
the condominium, and then I moved back into 
the home where we were residing for a couple 
of months until they got home in the middle 
of December, or whatever. 
Q She had been living in that house while you 
had been separated, is that correct? 
A Correct. 
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Q And is it true that she received some settlement 
funds in the Decree in the amount of $16,000.00, 
and she used those funds partially for the down 
payment on the condominium? 
A Correct. 
(R. 144-145) 
Plaintiff also testified concerning a loan payment in 
the amount of $131.50 which was used to pay for drapes and a 
refrigerator which were purchased for the condominium. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). On cross-examination, plaintiff 
stated as follows: 
(R. 114) 
Q (By Mr. Snyder) But in truth and in fact, you 
knew that you were going to have to buy a 
refrigerator for that condominium, and you were 
going to have to put some drapes in it, and 
that type of thing, and you knew that in connection 
wit the purchase of the condominium, and you 
contemplated doing .that at the time of the 
Decree, isn't that true? You may not have 
known the price, but you knew you were going to 
have to get a refrigerator and drapes? 
A (By Mrs. Christiansen) I knew I was going to 
have to get a refrigerator. Kent gave me 
$16,000.00, and I paid down $15,000.00, so I 
figured the extra thousand I could use on a 
fridge and a few things. But I just didn't--! 
guess I figured that, but I didn't realize that 
the drapes and all those things would come to 
so much. Am I saying too much? 
It 1s clear from the plaintiff's own testimony that the 
loan to pay for drapes and refrigerator in connection with 
the purchase of the condominium came about largely because 
of the plaintiff's own expensive taste and was a discretionary 
expense rather than something that was necessary for the 
welfare and benefit of the children. 
It is even more clear that the purchase of the condominium 
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by the plaintiff was contemplated by and took place contempor-
aniously with the entry of the Decree of Divorce.· It should 
be abundantly clear from the plaintiff's owri testimony that 
her monthly expenses were $800.00 at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce and that they increased by approximately $365.00 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) for the home and utility expenses 
immediately upon the purchase of the condominium, , .. Furthermore, 
parties contemplated that the $1,200.00 paid by the d~fendant 
as alimony and support took into consideration the increased 
expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the purchase of the 
condominium. The trial court cannot now use those new 
living facilities and the increased expenses in connection 
therewith to justify further increases in child support for 
the parties' two minor children. 
The trial court also considered the plaintiff's increased 
expenses for child care of $250.00 per month which were 
necessitated by her obtaining employment (R. 45). The 
difficulty with that proposition is that the trial court 
again completely disregarded the increased income of the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff's current ability to participate 
in and provide funds for the support of the parties' minor 
chiidren. It is redundant to continu~ to note the previous 
findings of the court that the plaintiff had no income at 
the time of the Decree of Divorce and that at the time of 
the modification hearing, she had gross income of approxi-
mately $800.00 and net income of approximately $550.0q but 
certainly if the court is not going to consider the plaintiff's 
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increased income as bearing on the issue of decreasing the 
alimony, then the court ought to consider the plaintiff's 
increased income as bearing on her ability to provide for 
the financial support of the parties' minor children. It is 
difficult to understand how the trial court can only consider 
expenses which are necessitated by the plaintiff's obtaining 
employment without considering income that is generated and 
inures to the benefit of the plaintiff and the parties' 
minor children resulting from that employment. 
The only other increased expenses that were considered 
by the court in connection with the modification and increase 
1n the amount of child support payments were a general 
observation about inflation and dancing and other lessons 
for the children which were given only minimal weight by the 
court. (R. 45-46). Considering the length of time between 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the subsequent modification 
hearing (a total time period of slightly more than two 
years), it is difficult to justify a sixty-four percent 
(64%) increase in the total amount of child support based 
u~n inflationary increases which probably totaled something 
in the neighborhood of ten percent (~0%) per year. 
Although they are not mentioned in the trial court's 
Decision {Appendix A), plaintiff also claimed increased 
automobile expenses resulting from her trading in a 1975 
Mustang II automobile which was fully paid for and purchasing 
a 1980 Chevrolet Camara automobile which was not. (R. 102). 
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Similarly, the washer ana dryer referred to on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 3, and for which plaintiff claimed increased expenses 
in the amount of $65.00 per month, was· not even purchased 
until after the filing of the Order to Show Cause in Re 
Modification by the plaintiff and had not been delivered to 
the defendant's residence at the time of the trial of this 
matter. (R. 103-104). The medical bills and expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff have been continuously paid for by 
the defendant as a courtesy to his former wife. (R. 148). 
Clearly, such expenses are either discretionary expenses 
(in the case of the automobile and the washer and dryer) or 
are expenses which are not properly chargeable to the defendant 
since he was already paying for them anyway (such as the 
medical expenses) and were properly excluded from the trial 
court's consideration in connection with the Decision rendered 
by the court. (See Appendix A). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING 
DEFENDANT'S PRESENT GROSS INCOME AND COMPARING THAT WITH HIS 
NET INCOME AT THE TIME OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Paragraph 19 of the original Findings of Fact entered 
on July 17, 1979 herein provides: 
8. The defendant is a self-employed dentist 
with a net income of approximately $30,000.00 
for the calendar year 1978. 
(Emphasis added, R. 19). 
The trial court's Decision (Appendix A) contains the 
following paragraph: 
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(R. 46). 
In addition ta· the foregoing, the defendant 
has increased his gross income considerably 
since the Decree of Divorce was entered when 
his net income was approximately $30,000.00 
per year. His present mode of doing business 
through a professional corporation and payment 
of a salary is not indicative of the real earnings 
of the defendant. This especially true in the 
1980-81 period since 1979 included a $41,000.00 
loss item which does not appear in subsequent 
returns. In addition, an increase of approxi-
mately $19,000.00 has been established in the 
gross earnings in the 1980-81 period. 
At the conclusion of the trial of this matter, defendant 
was ordered to furnish the court with copies of his 1979 and 
1980 individual income tax returns as well as his 1980 
corporate income tax return~ Those tax returns were furnished 
to the court by counsel for the defendant and appear in this 
Court's Exhibit Packet although, with the exception of the 
1980 individual tax return, they are not labeled as exhibits. 
The defendant testified that he incorporated his business 
as a professional corporation in June of 1980 (R. 129). He 
further testified that he was paying himself a salary which 
amounts to approximately $36,000.00 net per year (R. 134). 
Defendant further testified that his alimony and child 
support payments are made from out of his salary and that he 
pays the other expenses which were listed on defendant's 
Exhibit 6 from out of his net earnings (R. 134-136). Defendant 
also testified that the corporation had not paid any dividends 
excepting an amount that was used to fund the tail-end of a 
Keogh retirement program. The---defendant has received no 
dividends whatsoever and he is still living in a 
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rented apartment and off of ·his relatively modest salary 
which has increased approximately $6,000.00 over a two year 
period (R. 134). There is certainly no evidence of lavish 
or luxurious living on the part of the defendant and it is 
clear that the gross income from his dental practice is put 
right back into the corporation to pay leases, salaries,. 
equipment, retirement plans, taxes, etc. (R. 135). The 
trial court's Decision (Appendix A) concerning the defendant's 
income and ability to pay increases in child support should 
have been based on his annual net income as was considered 
in the original Findings of Fact, not on the defendant's 
gross earnings and particularly not on the gross earnings of 
the defendant's corporation. 
It is clear from the record that the defendant's increase 
in net income has only been approximately twenty percent 
(20%) over a two year period and that his income barely 
satisfies his own expenses, including his alimony and child 
support obligation, as well as the cost of the medical 
expenses that he pays on behalf of the plaintiff. The 
monthly budget submitted by the defendant on Exhibit 6 
contains few, if anyr luxury items and was not even cross-
examined by counsel for the plaintiff. Comparing the net 
income of the defendant recited in the original Findings of 
Fact entered at the time of the Decree of Divorce and the 
gross income referred to in the trial court's Decision 
(Appendix A) is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges 
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and should not form a basis upon which child support can be 
increased. 
Defendant submits that the evidence when properly 
considered by the trial court compels the conclusion that 
the plaintiff's expenses have not increased significantly 
since the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. In addition, 
any major increases in connection with the acquisition of 
new living facilities by the plaintiff were contemplated by 
the parties at. the time they entered into the Stipulation 
and Prqperty Settlement Agreement and occurred contemporaniously 
with the.entry of the Decree of Divorce. Furthermore, the 
court's finding that the.plaintiff's personal needs have not 
materially increased in that she has now obtained employment 
and is partially providing.for her own support mandates that 
the court either consider the plaintiff's income in reducing 
alimony payments or that the court consider plaintiff's 
income as bearing on her ability to provide some of the 
economic support for the parties' minor children. Defendant 
further submits that the defendant's net income has had only 
a marginal increase which is consistent with the inflationary 
economy and that the trial court's attempts to compare the 
net income referred to in the Findings of Fact entered at 
the time of the Decree of Divorce with gross income· reflected 
on the defendant's personal and corporate tax returns is 
like attempting to compare apples and oranges. Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the increase in 
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child support payments ordered herein. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE REQUIREMENT 
THAT HE MAINTAIN THE PLAINTIFF ON HIS HEALTH 
AND MEDICAL INSURANCE ELIMINATED FROM THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
In the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed by the 
defendant herein, defendant requested that the court eliminate 
the requirement from the Decree of Divorce that the defendant 
be required to maintain the plaintiff on his health and 
medical insurance policy (R. 38). The trial court in its 
Decision did not specifically rule on that question but 
presumably denied defendant's request. 
With regard to the question of insurance, plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
(R. 108). 
Q (By Mr. Snyder) And you~ in fact, have had 
your own medical insurance during that period 
of time available through your own employment, 
isn't that true? 
A {By Mrs. Christiansen) Yes, sir. • • • 
Defendant submits that the need for defendant to obtain 
medical insurance for the plaintiff's benefit has been 
obviated by reason of the plaintiff's obtaining employment 
and her employment providing that medical insurance for her. 
Plaintiff has voluntarily chosen to purchase medical insur-
ance covering herself through her employment and the cover-
age provided by the defendant herein merely duplicates that 
coverage. Defendant should not be forced to pay for 
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plaintiff's out-of-pocket medical expenses and provide major 
medical insurance coverage for the plaintiff if she has her 
own insurance available and if that insurance provides 
duplicate coverage (R. 92, 108, 148). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES OR ALTERNATIVELY THE 
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HEREIN SHOULD BE 
REDUCED. 
Section 30-30-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended 
provides: 
The court may order either party to pay to the 
clerk a sum of money for the separate support 
and maintenance of the adverse party and the 
children, and to enable such party to prosecute 
or defend the action. 
That section follows the provisions of Section 30-3-1 
which defines the procedure, residence and grounds for 
obtaining a decree of divorce and Section 30-3-2 which 
indicates that a husband shall have the same rights as a 
wife to obtain a decree of divorce. There is nowhere in any 
of the statutes that defendant's counsel has ever found a 
provision that authorizes an award of attorney's fees in a 
post divorce modification proceeding. Defendant submits 
that the provisions of Section 30-3-3 were drafted for the 
purpose of authorizing an award of costs or attorney fees to 
enable a party to pursue or defend a divorce action and that 
the provisions of Section 30-3-3 were not intended to apply 
in modification proceedings. Defendant submits that this 
Court should clarify whether or not provisions of Section 
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30-3-3 should apply to permit awards of attorney fees in 
post divorce modification proceedings. 
The court herein received evidence from plaintiff's 
counsel that his time and attorney's fees in this matter 
were worth $180.00 (R. 152). There was contrary evidence 
introduced by the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff 
had indicated to the defendant that she was not being charged 
attorney's fees because the individual she had been dating 
prior to the initiation of the Order to Show Cause was an 
attorney and had arranged with Mr. Allen K. Young, attorney 
for the plaintiff, to represent her on a "freebee" basis (R. 
151). In spite of that testimony, the court awarded attorney 
fees of $200.00 which exceeds the amount requested by counsel 
for the plaintiff. Defendant submits that the award of 
attorney fees herein should by eliminated or at least reduced 
to the amount of $180.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits that he has demonstrated a material 
change in circumstances which justifies the court in reducing 
the amount of alimony payments as set forth in the original 
Decree of Divorce. The specific findings of the trial court 
entered at the time of the Decree of Divorce as reflected in 
the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, (Appendix 
B), the Minute Entry, (Appendix C), and the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, together with the uncontroverted 
evidence of the plaintiff's present earning capacity, justify 
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a reversal of the trial court's refusal to reduce the alimony 
award or alternatively mandate the conclusion that the case 
should be remanded to have the trial court determine an 
appropriate amount for the reduction of alimony. 
The expenses cited by the plaintiff to justify a need 
for increases in child support are either in the nature of 
expenses that were contemplated by the parties at the time 
of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and 
were in connection with the purchase of the plaintiff's new 
condominium, or ·are in the nature of discretionary expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff,and should not be used to penalize 
the defendant by ordering increased child support. The 
trial court's observations in its Decision, (Appendix A), 
that the plaintiff's personal needs have not materially 
increased in that she now has obtained employment and is 
providing partially for her own support (R. 46), further 
compel the conclusion that either the plaintiff's income 
must be considered in reducing the amount of alimony ordered 
hereunder or must be considered 1n connection with the child 
support payments ordered herein since the plaintiff is now 
clearly capable of participating in and providing for the 
economic support of the parties' minor children. Further-
more, the court has engaged in a convoluted anaylsis which 
compares the defendant's net income at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce with his present gross income uses that 
analysis to justify an increase in child support based upon 
-35-
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the defendant's increased earning capacity. 
Defendant further submits that he is entitled to an 
order of this Court eliminating the requirement that he 
maintain the plaintiff on his health and medical insurance 
policy and for a reduction or elimination of the attorney 
fees as awarded herein. 
DATED this 2l{ft_day of February, 1982 • 
. f?-~.' JtrA, £=i~ 
CRAIG M. tNYDER, for: . . . 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Mr. Allen K. Young, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 
350 East Center, Provo, Utah, 84601, this ~day of February, 
·19 82. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN, Civil Case No. 51,095 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENT CHRISTIANSEN, D E C I S I 0 N 
Decision. 
This matter came before the Court on the 3rd day of September, 
1981, Allen K. Young, Esq., appearing for the plaintiff and Craig M. 
Snyder, Esq., appearing for the defendant. Plaintiff first applied 
to the Court for an Order to Show Cause why the support provision 
of the Decree of Divorce should not be increased for the two minor 
children of the parties, to which the defendant has counter-
petitioned for a reduction of the alimony or child support 
awarded by the Decree of Divorce, which was stipulated to by the 
parties. The parties presented their evidence and copies of the 
defendant's income tax returns were secured for the Court's 
inspection, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement 
and having fully considered same, now enters the following: 
DECISION 
The Court finds that the expenses of plaintiff in rearing the 
minor children have increased hy virtue of inflation since the 
entry of the Decree herein on July 17, 1979, although the expenses 
of the minor children were not established by any findings of fact 
or stipulations on file herein at the time the Decree was entered. 
TheCourt further finds that there have been other increases 
iD that the plaintiff has acquired new living facilities for her-
self and the children and having obtained employment has an 
inc~e~sed expense of $250.00 per month for child care. Other 
expe~ses such as dancing and other lessons for the ~hildren are 
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APPENDIX II A" 
given only minimal weight by the Court in arriving at the increase 
in child support that is justifiable under the changed circ~~stances 
of the children's needs. 
In addition to the foregoing, the defendant has increased his 
gross income considerably since the Decree of Divorce was entered 
when his net income was approximately $30,000.00 per year. His 
present mode of doing business through a personal corporation and 
payment of a salary is not indicative of the real e_arnings of the 
defendant. This especially true in the 1980-81 period since 1979 
included a $41,000.00 loss item which does not appear in subsequent 
returns. In addition, an increase of approximately $1~,ooo.oo has 
been established in the gross earnings in the 1980-81 period. 
Based upon the above and foregoing findings, and upon the 
finding in the Decree of Divorce that only the plaintiff's 
economic needs, without regard to defendant's income, is the sole 
basis for increase in alimony and the further finding by the Court 
that plaintiff's personal needs have not materially increased in 
that she has now obtained employment and is providing partially for 
her own support, the Court concludes as follows: 
1. That the child support payable by the defendant to plaintiff 
for the support and maintenance of his two minor children should be 
increased the additional sum of $175.00 per month per child, making 
the total sum per month of $450.00 per month per child, the same 
payable semi-monthly together with alimony at such time as in the 
original Decree provided. 
2. The Court further concludes that a sufficient change of 
circumstance has not been shown to justify the reduction or 
elimination of the alimony paid by defendant to plaintiff, and the 
amount provided in the original Decree shall continue. 
3. The Court further finds that the defendant should pay to 
the plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorney, Allen K. 
Young, the sum of $200.00 for his services herein, which the Cour~ 
-2-
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APPENDIX "A" 
finds is reasonable. Defendant to pay .the costs incurred herein. 
counsel for the plaintiff is directed to ?repare an appro-
priate amendment to the Decree of Divorce consistent with the 
foregoing Decision. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this 
77 f day of October, 
1981. 
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APPENDIX "8" ' 
WAYNE B. WATSON, OF 
GROW & WATSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1325 South 800 East 
Suite 310 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: 225-8300 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 51,095 
KENT CHRISTIANSEN, 
Defendant . 
. WHEREAS, the Plaintiff above named has commenced an action 
for divorce against the Defendant, and 
WHEREAS, it is the desire and intention of the parties 
hereto to dispose of their property rights and other rights and 
obligations arising out of their marriage in the event a Decree 
of Divorce is granted by the Court onthe Plaintiff's Complaint. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual execution 
of this Agreement, the parties hereto hereby Stipulate and Agree, 
subject to the approval of the above-entitled Court, that in the 
event a Decree of Divorce is entered on the Plaintiff's Complaint, 
that the said Decree may contain the following provisions and 
that the same may be incorporated therein. 
1. The Defendant hereby agrees that the Answer previously 
filed in this matter may be withdrawn and reques~the Court to 
. 
treat this matter as a default, requiring no further notice to 
him. 
2. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the care, custody and 
control of Alicia Christiansen and Chad Christiansen, the two 
minor children of the parties hereto, subject to the rights of 
the Defendant to visi~ with said children at reasonable times and 
places, and under reasonable circumstances. 
3. The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum ~f 
$275.00 ?er month per child, child support, to assist in ~he 
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APPENDIX "B" CONTINUED .. 
2 
support and maintenance of each of the minor children of the 
parties hereto, together with $650.00 per month alimony. Said 
payments shall be made in equal semi-monthly installments of 
$600.00 each, on or before the 1st and 15th days of each month 
commencing August 1, 1979, and continuing thereafter on the 1st 
and 15th days of each month until the Court otherwise orders. 
4. The Defendant shall pay and discharge any and all 
outstanding debts and obligations of the parties hereto incurred 
prior to their separation and shall hold the Plaintiff harmless 
from further liability thereon. 
5. That the Defendant shall maintain hospital and medical 
insurance policies in full force and effect on the Plaintiff and 
the minor children of the parties with an annual deductible not 
to exceed $100.00. It is expressly understood that in the event 
Plaintiff remarries, Defendant will not be responsible for 
maintaining a hospital and medical insurance policy for her 
benefit. 
6. The Plaintiff shall be awarded as her sole and separate 
property the 1975 Ford Mustang automobile, together with any and 
all personal property in her possession as of the date of this 
Stipulation. 
7. The Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and separat~ 
property the 1978 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile, together with 
any and all personal property in his possession as of the date 
of this Stipulation, including all business property accounts and 
equipment. In lieu of any claims upon the business or any other 
property acquired by the parties during their marriage, except for 
such properties as the Plaintiff has in her possession, the De-
fendant shall pay to her the sum of $16,000.00 cash upon approval 
of this Stipulation by the Court. 
8. The Defendant shall pay to the PJaintiff the sum of 
$375.00 for the use and benefit of her attorney herein, together 
with costs in the amount of $25.00. 
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APPENDIX "B" CONTINUED 
3 
9. The parties further stipulate th~t they hereby 
request the Court to make a finding of fact that the Plaintiff 
presently has no inco~e, and that future increases in alimony 
shall be based solely upon Plaintiff's economic needs without 
any regard whatsoever to a possible increase in Defendant's 
income status. 
10. Each of the parties acknowledge that they have read 
the foregoing Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and 
understand the contents thereof; that there have been no 
promises or representations made by either party to the other to 
induce the execution of this Agreement which are not specifically 
set forth herein. 
DATED this J3 day of July, 1979. 
.a~1<1Y&~ 
WA~ . WATSON, 
Ai:(!;,6rney for Defendant 
(1 '14/ {!, (11l i.~",~1Ud .__/ 
~NA C. CHRISTIAN~EN, Plaintiff 
vi;· / : -~,,,.......- , 
; ' \ i ' 
l; . - ( \.. -t-, ,'. -0 ,· •.• ·\... 1_ '·. , ·-'~- -· .. _ 
- - : \ l ) .. _ 
KENT CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant 
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APPENDIX "C" --c~ ~ - . 
In the fourth Judicial District Court 
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN, 
KENT CHRISTIANSEN, 
of the St.ate ol Utah 
In and For Utah County 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 51 , 09 5 
DATED July 17, 1979 
George E. Ballif JUDGZ 
Reported by Myron A. Frazier, C.S.R. 
DIVORCE 
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned matter. 
The plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Noall T. Wootton. The 
defendant was not present but was represented by counsel Wayne B. Watson. 
Mr. Wootton addressed the court and represented the defendant has 
withdrawn his answer & agreed to his default being entered through the sti pu-
1 ati on and property settlement agreement. Mr. Watson concurred in those rep-
resentations. 
Jana C. Christiansen was sworn and testified in her own behalf. 
The court finds the material allegations are true and correct and 
the plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from the defendant on the grounds 
of mental cruelty. 
The court approved the stipulation and property settlement agree-
ment and ordered the decree entered consistent therewith. Counsel stated for 
the record that plaintiff has 11 0" income at this time. 
For good cause shown the decree to become final upon its signing 
by the court and entry by the clerk in the register of actions. 
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